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Background: The Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS) has led to an in-
crease in breached health records and violation of patient confidentiality. The South Af-
rican constitution makes provision for human dignity and privacy, virtues which
confidentiality seeks to preserve. Confidentiality thus constitutes a human right which is
challenged by the use of technology.
Humans, as managers of information technology, constitute the weakest link in safe-
guarding confidentiality. Nonetheless, it is argued that most security breaches are non-
intentionally committed by well-meaning employees during routine activities.
Objective: The purpose of this article is to explore the nature of and reasons for confiden-
tiality breaches by PACS users in a South African context.
Methods: A closed-ended questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data from 115
health professionals employed in a private hospital setting, including its radiology
department and a second independent radiology department. The questionnaire sought to
explore the attitudes of participants towards confidentiality breeches and reasons for such
behaviour.
Results: Breach incidences were expressed as percentage compliance and classified ac-
cording to the nature and reasons provided by Sarkar's breach classification. Cross tabu-
lations indicated a statistical significance (p < 0.00) between the expected and observed
confidentiality practices of participants and also the adequacy of training, system knowl-
edge and policy awareness.
Conclusion: Our study supports previous findings that, in the absence of guidelines, most
security breaches were non-intentional acts committed due to ignorance. Of concern are
incidents in which sensitive information was intentionally shared via social media.
© 2016 The Authors. Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Johannesburg Uni-
versity. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1 (w); fax: þ27 076939425
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1.1. Background and problem statement
Patients suspect that health professionals (HPs) may be
abusing their privileges of authorised access to medical re-
cords (Akyu¨z & Erdermir, 2013). Of particular concern are
the intentional confidentiality breaches due to acts of
indiscretion (Knapp van Bogaert & Ogunbanyo, 2014). One
example of indiscretion in the United Kingdom (UK) was
reported where HPs shared sensitive data of patients stored
in the Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS)
for entertainment purposes (“Lack of confidentiality”, 2004).
According to the literature, the use of information tech-
nology (IT) introduces new risks of compromising confi-
dential data to an extent not possible with paper records
(Griffith, 2015).
In the past, the breach of confidentiality involved access to
paper and film records, which were often stored in a central
location making it difficult to compromise the principles of
confidentiality. Despite this benefit, the paper system
imposed disadvantages that became an impediment to the
continuity of patient care because the records could be easily
misplaced and thus difficult to retrieve resulting in delayed
medical treatment (Beach & Oates, 2014). To address this
limitation, advances in IT led to the development of a digital
storage modality for radiology data (radiographs and reports)
known as PACS.
Although PACS is inherently a radiology archiving system,
it can be used in various other sectionswithin a hospital. PACS
allows for the remote and instant access to radiology data by a
multidisciplinary complement of HPs who are based in
different locations within a hospital setting, and thus data of
the same patientmay be accessed simultaneously by different
HPs (Bolan, 2013). PACS has contributed to improved patient
care by increasing efficiency and accessibility to data and has
led to fewer delays in the clinical management of patients
(Bolan, 2013). A possible disadvantage of PACS is that the pa-
tients' data is archived on the internet and it is thus possible
for unauthorised people to gain access to the data, for
instance by internet hackers. It is also possible for data to be
duplicated and exported without the patient's knowledge and
consent (Benatar, 2010).
The number of breached electronic health records in the
United States (US) increased to 137% between 2012 and 2013
(Collier, 2012). These breaches highlight how confidentiality
is at an increased level of threat as a result of using IT.
There is evidence to indicate that most security breaches
are non-intentional threats caused by employees when
conducting routine work activities (Barlow, 2015). In South
Africa there is no documented data on the types of
breaches that have occurred as a result of using PACS
technology.
South Africa could prevent the increase in breach in-
cidences as reported in the US if the reasons for breaches and
the types of breaches were known. Knowledge of the types of
breaches could contribute towards the formulation of guide-
lines that would ensure that the doctorepatient relationship
would not be jeopardised by the use of IT.1.2. Purpose and objectives
The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that the na-
ture of most security breaches committed by HPs authorised
to use PACS is non-intentional. The objective of this quanti-
tative, correlational study conducted on HPs at two private
hospital settings in Johannesburg was to examine the
following:
 Participants' pre-existing knowledge of data protection
policy, knowledge of PACS data protection features and
their attitudes towards breaches of confidentiality.
 The nature and classification of breaches committed when
using PACS.1.3. Definition of key terms
In this study two major categories of breaches, namely
intentional and non-intentional, were considered. The non-
intentional breaches were further classified into accidental
breaches and breaches resulting from ignorance and were
defined as follows:
 Accidental breaches e these are violations resulting from
inadequate system knowledge and stress (Sarkar, 2010, p.
115).
 Breaches arising from ignorance e these are violations
caused by a lack of training and awareness of policy
(Sarkar, 2010, p. 166).
 Intentional breaches e these refer to violations emanating
from deliberate ignorance of rules and data theft (Sarkar,
2010, p. 166).2. Theory
People constitute the weakest link in the safeguarding of
confidentiality (Princely, 2012). It was found that in the United
States human error is the leading cause of data breaches in the
banking and IT sectors (Liginlal, Sim, Khansa, & Fearn, 2012).
Some breachesmay be intentional due to the deliberate intent
to ignore policy. Reports on cybersecurity relating to the
corporate and law industries indicate that while some
disgruntled employees deliberately steal data with a motive
for revenge against the institution (Simshaw, 2015), some
breach confidentiality to satisfy their curiosity or for personal
financial gain (Griffith, 2015). The underlying causes for
human error as a precursor to breaches, according to Liginlal
et al. (2012), are inadequate knowledge of security policy, a
stressful environment with regard to time pressures and
limitations in the system design.
Moreover, the law lags behind in keeping pace with the
advances in IT (Polito, 2012). The purpose of legislation is to
provide guidelines in terms of security policy while education
is crucial in providing the required knowledge to enable
adherence to policy (Kwon & Johnson, 2013). The gap in
teaching may result in limited knowledge specific to the
confidentiality of electronic data in terms of medical ethics,
human rights and patients' rights. Breaches committed due to
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rance (Sarkar, 2010: 115). The adoption of technology in
healthcare requires HPs to learn job-specific skills in terms of
the latest technology that could be imparted through training
(Shange, 2014). Thus, to protect confidentiality in the tech-
nology age requires a seamless integration of education in
medical ethics and training on the ethical usage of informa-
tion technology (Kwon & Johnson, 2013).
The medical world is concerned with saving lives which
requires efficiency in decision-making and quick execution of
tasks. The efficiency required in a medical emergency in-
troduces time pressures leading to a stressful working envi-
ronment for HPs and increasing the risk of committing errors
(Adams, 2012). Human errors could arise due to the need to
circumvent security measures to save the life of the patient
(Bernat, 2013). A medical emergency could thus create an
ethical dilemma that forces HPs to focus on saving lives and
neglect the protection of patient confidentiality.
The medical environment is also centred on team work
which creates a culture of trust and support amongHPs (Brody
& Doukas, 2014). Considering that HPs are bound by oath to
protect patient confidentiality (Gautberg & Batalden, 2014),
there may be the assumption that all HPs are ethical beings
and thus respect patient confidentiality at all times. It is
therefore often unclear whether the culture of trust in fact
encourages poor supervision of HPs in protecting
confidentiality.
The challenge facing the protection of confidentiality is not
limited to pinpointing the implications of human error but
also to identifying the reasons for the breaches and the nature
of these breaches. Patients may be comforted by the knowl-
edge that intentional breaches are in the minority, and that
most breaches committed by HPs are non-intentional threats
(Liginlal et al., 2012). It was anticipated that this study might
provide insight into the nature of breaches involving PACS
data. This insight could inform future practice in terms of
handling confidential information when using PACS.Table 1 e Breakdown of study sample.
Sample Frequency Percent
Study sample
Doctor 7 6
Radiologist 9 8
Radiographer 41 35
Nurse 53 46
Student radiographers 4 3
Paramedics 2 2
Incomplete questionnaire 1
Total 115 100
Sample groups based on reasons for PACS access
Radiology sample 53 46
Non-radiology sample 62 54
Total 115 1003. Materials and methods
3.1. Materials
The study was conducted on health professionals with access
to health records stored in PACS during the course of their
work.
3.2. Setting
An invitation to participate in the study was extended to six
private hospitals affiliated to different healthcare facility
groups and located within the city of Johannesburg. For this
study a 75% refusal rate to participate was observed. The
sensitivity of the topicwas a concern for two hospitals, while a
further two hospitals did not respond to the study invitation.
One hospital and its radiology department gave permission
and was termed “research setting 1”. A radiology department
in a different hospital consented to participate in the study,
although the hospital itself failed to respond to the invitation.
The independent radiology department was termed “researchsetting 2”. The study population was thus sampled from
research settings 1 and 2.
Setting 2 comprised only the radiology population (N ¼ 19);
two of which were radiologists plus 17 radiographers. Setting
1 comprised a complement of the radiology and non-radiology
population groups (N ¼ 210). The non-radiology population in
setting 1 included 80 medical doctors, including medical
specialists, and 100 nursing staff (registered nurses, intensive
care nurses, assistant nurses, caregivers and student nurses).
The radiology group in setting 1 included 10 radiographers, 4
radiography students and 16 radiologists (5 of whom were
locum radiologists).
It was predetermined by the statistician that a sample size
of 100 participants was necessary to achieve statistically
meaningful results. The study sample was acquired through
non-probability quota sampling (Daniel, 2012). A sample size
(n ¼ 115) was derived from the two research settings, setting 2
provided a sample size of 17 (n ¼ 17) and setting 1 a sample
size of 98 (n¼ 98). A detailed breakdown of the study sample is
provided in Table 1. The study sample was divided into two
groups (radiology and non-radiology groups) based on their
reasons for accessing PACS data. The radiology group
included HPs that accessed PACS as part of their routine ac-
tivity (radiologists, radiographers, student radiographers)
while the non-radiology group included HPs that accessed
PACS as part of patient clinical management (nurses, doctors,
medical specialists). Assistant nurses, caregivers and student
nurses in setting 1 were excluded because they were pro-
hibited by the hospital from accessing PACS. Therefore, only
registered nurses and intensive care nurses were included.
3.3. Design
A correlational study design was employed to collect quanti-
tative data.3.4. Procedure
A self-designed questionnaire, the Picture Archiving and
Communication-Confidentiality Scale (PAC-CS), was used.
The questionnaire design was informed by the ISO 17799
model fromwhich the constructs, the choice of questions and
their quantification were derived and adapted. The ISO 17799
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compliance with international standards of data security and
was therefore deemed suitable for the PAC-CS design
(Karabacak& Sogukpinar, 2006). The PAC-CS comprised close-
ended questions aimed at determining the participants' pre-
existing knowledge about the PACS data protection features,
knowledge on their organisation's data protection policy and
the participants' attitudes towards confidentiality breaches. A
pilot study was conducted prior to the data collection. Since
hand-delivery is associated with a greater response rate
compared to mailed questionnaires (Nimon, Zientek, &
Henson, 2012), the PAC-CS questionnaire was hand-
delivered and self-administered to the participants over a
period of three months.
3.5. Analysis
To eliminate bias, responses were captured and analysed by
an independent statistician by means of the Statistical Pack-
age for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 16. The process of data
analysis was organised into three phases. In the first phase,
the researcher used guidelines by the US Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 to establish
benchmarks for best practice. A 90% benchmark was set for
minimum recommended compliance and 10% for intolerable
levels of non-compliance. The researcher believed that the
use of international standards was justified because (i) the
researcher could not locate any guidelines applicable in South
Africa that were specific to PACS technology; (ii) the HIPAA
legislation has been consulted to inform the security needs of
the PACS (Cao, Huang, & Zhou, 2003: p. 185) and (iii) the PAC-
CS was designed using a model for compliance based on in-
ternational standards.
In the second phase the documented breaches were
quantified using weight values derived from the ISO7799
model. The numerical data was then expressed in terms of
frequency counts. Statistical significance (p < 0.05) was
calculated using the one-sample Chi-square test for non-
parametric data, the choice of which was informed by the
lack of randomisation, sample size and type of the data
collected. While the cross-tabulations determined the degree
of statistical significance, the phi coefficient helped to deter-
mine the extent of the correlation, the strength of which was
determined by the Pearson Chi-square test. In the third phase
the reasons for breach incidences were determined and clas-
sified using Sarkar's analysis of insider threats (2010).4. Ethical considerations
Prior to the enquiry, ethical clearance was obtained from the
ethics committees of the two research settings as well as from
the University of Johannesburg, the Faculty of Health Sciences
Higher Degrees and Ethics Committees (ethical clearance
codes HDC67/02-2011 and AEC70/02-2011).
4.1. Potential benefits and hazards
The covering letter attached to the PAC-CS questionnaire set
out the study details for the participants. The informationcontained in the covering letter included an explanation of the
nature of the study, the study rationale, objectives, risks,
benefits and the right to withdrawwithout any repercussions.
Participation was voluntary and the participants did not
derive any personal benefits through participation. The
questionnaire did not require the inclusion of personal in-
formation and thus the participants' anonymity was ensured.
The responses were kept in a locked cabinet under constant
camera surveillance and could only be accessed by the
researcher. In this way the data in the questionnaires was
kept confidential.
4.2. Recruitment procedure
Non-probability quota sampling was deemed suitable for
achieving the predetermined sample size and permit com-
parison of the subgroups of the population as per the study's
inclusion criteria (Daniel, 2012).
For research setting 1, participants were recruited from
those sections of the hospital that had active PACS systems;
these included casualty, emergency room, doctors' consulting
rooms and intensive care units. At the time of the study, the
medical wards in the hospital were not linked to the radiology
PACS and were thus excluded. The researcher approached
HPs in the radiology and non-radiology domains who fitted
the study's inclusion criteria and were willing to participate.
Data was collected twice daily to access both day and night
shift workers. The researcher had no control over the
recruitment for research setting 2 as the practice manager
offered to distribute the questionnaire personally.
4.3. Informed consent
Informed consent was ensured by allowing participants to ask
questions relating to the study. Verbal consent was obtained
and implied through the completion of the questionnaire.
4.4. Data protection
The completed questionnaires were deposited in a sealed box.
4.5. Reliability
The findings of any study would be worthless unless the
findings were deemed accurate (valid) and reproducible (reli-
able). In this study, the integrity of the PAC-CS was examined
during a pilot test by peers that represented the sample
(Nimon et al., 2012). Although the PAC-CS is not amenable to
the Cronbach's test for reliability, its design is consistent with
the ISO 17799 model used to collect data on information se-
curity. Moreover, the study findings were consistent with the
increasing confidentiality breaches documented in the US.
4.6. Validity
Content validity of the PAC-CS was achieved by aligning the
constructs and questions in the questionnaire with those of
the ISO 17799 model. Useful inferences could thus be drawn
from the questionnaire responses (Cahit, 2015). The relevance
of the PAC-CS to the research domainwas assessed during the
Table 3 e Summary of participant's attitude towards
confidentiality breach.
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questions to ensure that the questions were expressed clearly
and without ambiguity.
Admission of confidentiality breach when using PACS
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 114 C
Yes ¼ 10% Yes 11 (10%) 10 (9%) 90%***
No 103 (90%) 104 (91%)
Incidences where colleagues were witnessed using PACS
data for reasons other than medical purposes
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 115 C
Yes ¼ 10% Yes 12 (10%) 17 (15%) 70%*
No 103 (90%) 98 (85%)
Incidences where intentional confidentiality breach was
reported to authorities
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 21 C
Yes ¼ 90% Yes 19 (90%) 10 (48%) 52%*
No 2 (10%) 11 (52%)
Values are given as N expressed in frequency counts.
B, set benchmark (indicated by the percentage next to the desired
response)
EN, Expected N.
ON, Observed N.
C, Extent of compliance.
*p ¼ 0.00; **p < 0.05; ***p > 0.05.5. Results and findings
Based on the data analysis, the following was found.
Objective 1: To examine participants' knowledge of PACS
data protection features, their pre-existing knowledge of data
protection policy and their attitudes towards confidentiality
breaches.
It is a legal requirement of the HIPAA of 1996 to de-identify
medical data. In this study, 58% of the participants were able
to download data from PACS but 72% of the participants were
unable to de-identify data downloaded from PACS (Table 2).
Clear policy and guidelines tend to improve ethical re-
sponses to security issues even in the case of individuals with
lower ethical attitudes. The answers of the participants
revealed that 62% of participants were poorly informed about
their organisation's policy on data security (Table 2).
It is known that patients suspect that HPs may be breach-
ing the confidentiality of their medical records (Akyu¨z &
Erdermir, 2013), it is thus crucial to determine the HPs
commitment towards the protection of confidentiality and
their attitude towards breaches in order to prevent such
breaches. Table 3 indicates that, of the confidentiality
breaches (15%) witnessed by fellow HPs, 48% were reported to
the authorities.
Objective 2: To examine the nature and classification of
breaches committed when using PACS.
It is considered an abuse of the PACS to browse the work
list without an intended purpose (Nicholson, 2008). By
browsing the PACS without a reason, HPs may access data ofTable 2 e Summary of participant's ability to download
data from the PACS and awareness of organisational
policy on data protection.
Ability to download data from PACS
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 112 C
No ¼ 90% Yes 11 (10%) 65 (58%) 17%*
No 101 (90%) 47 (42%)
Ability of PACS to de-identify patients' data
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 64 C
Yes ¼ 90% Yes 58 (90%) 16 (28%) 28%*
No 6 (10%) 48 (72%)
Awareness of organisation's data policy pertaining to
electronic data
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 114 C
Yes ¼ 90% Yes 103 (90%) 39 (38%) 38%*
No 11 (10%) 75 (62%)
Values are given as N expressed in frequency counts.
B, set benchmark (indicated by the percentage next to the desired
response)
EN, Expected N.
ON, Observed N.
C, Extent of compliance.
*p ¼ 0.00; **p < 0.05; ***p > 0.05.patients not assigned to them and thus breach confidentiality
(Matlakala &Mokoena, 2011). In this study, 7% of participants
admitted to browsing the PACS work list for no valid purpose;
and 67% of the participants accessed data of patients not
assigned to their care (Table 4).
Provided that confidentiality is maintained, it is permis-
sible to use PACS data for non-medical purposes such as
research, auditing and teaching (Nicholson, 2008). In this
study the non-medical uses of PACS data included teaching
(59%), research (31%), auditing (4%), and assignments (2%)
(Table 3). It is unclear whether confidentiality wasmaintained
during the non-medical uses of data considering that 72% of
the participants were unable to de-identify data downloaded
from PACS.
A further 28% admitted to sharing embarrassing patient
data with colleagues, friends and family members. Some of
the patients' data was transferred using social medial such as
blackberry messenger (BBM)-6% and Facebook (2%) (Table 5).
Yet, fewer than 10% of the participants admitted to breaching
patient confidentiality when using PACS (Table 3).
The results of the cross-tabulation indicated a statistical
significance between the expected and observed confidenti-
ality practices of participants and also between the adequacy
of system knowledge and policy awareness. Participants in
setting 2 were poorly informed about their organisation's
policy on electronic data security (Fig. 1), while radiology PACS
users tended to share embarrassing patient data with col-
leagues, friends and family members (Fig. 2).6. Discussion
It was found that most of the breach incidences (66%) in the
study were as a result of ignorance. In this study, two factors
Table 4 e Summary of participant's ability to download data for purposes other than medical purposes.
Download of data from patients not under one's care NB
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 113 C
Yes ¼ 10% Yes 11 (10%) 76 (67%) 14%* Accidental
No 102 (90%) 37 (33%)
Browsing the PACS work list for no valid purpose
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 114 C
No ¼ 90% Yes 11 (10%) 8 (7%) 97%*** Ignorance
No 103 (90%) 106 (93%)
Use of patients' data and images for non-medical purposes
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 114 C
Yes ¼ 10% Yes 11 (10%) 52 (46%) 21%*** Ignorance
No 103 (90%) 62 (54%)
Sharing embarrassing patient data for entertainment purposes
Benchmark Response EN ON:N ¼ 112 C
Yes ¼ 10% Yes 11 (10%) 32 (28%) 34%* Intentional
No 101 (90%) 82 (72%)
Values are given as N expressed in frequency counts.
B, set benchmark (indicated by the percentage next to the desired Response).
EN, Expected N.
ON, Observed N.
C, Extent of compliance.
*p ¼ 0.00; **p < 0.05; ***p > 0.05.
NB, Nature of breach.
Table 5 e Summary of methods used for data sharing and the various uses of the downloaded data.
Use of data and images for purposes other than patient management
Benchmark Response ON:N ¼ 81 NB
0% Teaching 48 (59%) Ignorance
Research 25 (31%) Ignorance
Auditing 3 (4%) Ignorance
Assignments 1 (2%) Ignorance
Other (Entertainment) 3 (4%) Intentional
Other (Social networks) 1 (2%) Intentional
Methods of data sharing N ¼ 48
Benchmark Response ON:N ¼ 48 NC
0% Telling 17 (35%) Ignorance
Images 25 (52%) Ignorance
Reports 1 (2%) Ignorance
BBM 3 (6%) Intentional
Email 1 (2%) Ignorance
Facebook 1 (2%) Intentional
Values are given as N expressed in frequency counts.
B, set benchmark (indicated by the percentage next to the desired response)
EN, Expected N.
ON, Observed N.
C, Extent of compliance.
NB, Nature of breach.
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namely a lack of knowledge regarding data protection policy
and the ease of access to electronic data.
Although access to patient data is crucial for the
advancement of the health profession through processes of
teaching and research, patients believe that their data is usedsolely for medical care (Knapp van Bogaert & Ogunbanyo,
2014). To balance this conflict, the National Health Act of
2003 (Act 61) allows for patient data to be used for research
provided that consent is obtained prior to the use and that the
data be anonymised. The electronic nature of PACS allows for
easy access to patient data and a flawless download without
Fig. 1 e Policy awareness setting one versus setting two.1. Research setting 1. 2. Research setting 2.Fig. 1 demonstrates the
cross-tabulation outcome between research setting one and two. Based on the above the participants in research setting
two were less informed about their organisation‘s policy on electronic data security. Mahlaola (2013).
Fig. 2 e Sharing of embarrassing patient data Radiology versus Non-radiology group.The cross-tabulation results between
research setting one and two are revealed in Fig.2 above. As demonstrated the radiology PACS users had the propensity to
share embarrassing patient data for entertainment purposes as compared to the non-radiology users. Mahlaola (2013).
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could thus argue that the attainment of patient consent by
HPs may be considered an unnecessary requirement. In this
study, it is unclear whether patients consented to the non-
medical use of their data. It is therefore possible that the
basic requirement of confidentiality, where the owners of data
should be informed of the data-sharing process, was breached
(Arora, Yttri, & Nilsen, 2014).
One breach involving participants who accessed data of
patients not assigned to their care could not be classified due
to a lack of clarity. Data exchange among HPs who share a
common patient is permissible (Muhlen & Ohno-Machado,
2012). In the absence of clarity, ignorance was deemed the
most logical explanation of data breaches.
Of concern are the incidents in which information was
shared via BBM or Facebook and thus assumed to be inten-
tional. One could argue that data shared via BBM is limited to a
particular audience compared to Facebook that allows access
to a wider audience. The internet does not guarantee againstunauthorised viewing and the use of personal information
(Moore, 2012). Therefore, BBM and Facebook are equally
vulnerable to internet hacking. Patients use the Internet to
research their medical conditions and are thus more likely to
uncover the breach of their confidentiality by HPs (Griffith,
2012). The discovery of breaches by patients could destroy
the mutual trust in the doctorepatient privilege. Thus to
evade embarrassment caused by possible confidentiality
breaches, patients may avoid seeking medical treatment
altogether (Kuo, Ma, & Alexander, 2014).
Sharing of embarrassing patient data with colleagues,
friends and family members is not a unique act. Similar
behaviour was observed in US clinicians who shared embar-
rassing medical photographs on social media (Muhlen &
Ohno-Machado, 2012). The expansion of Facebook from
being a social tool to a platform for addressing professional
discourse has been blamed for these breaches of confidenti-
ality (Oxley, 2014; Power, 2015).When intentional breaches are
conducted by health professionals, concerns about the
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(Wallace, 2015) and the adequacy of the teaching and
enforcement of medical ethics comes to the fore.
Clear policy guidelines can improve ethical responses to
security issues, even in the case of individuals with lower
ethical attitudes. This study revealed that 62% of the partici-
pants were ill-informed about their organisation's policy on
data security. At the time of the study, the United Kingdom
had the Data Protection Act of 1998 in place while the United
States (US) had the HIPAA of 1996 in place. South Africa was at
the time in the process of enacting the Protection of Personal
Information Bill (POPI). “Apart from the Constitution itself,
there is no legislation which deals specifically and fully with
information protection” (South Africa Law Reform, 2005, p. 9).
Contrast to the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of
2000 and the Electronic Communications and Transaction Act
25 of 2002; it was anticipated that the POPI Act of 2013 would
be the first such legislation to adequately address the issue of
data protection with the advent of IT. The researcher could
not locate any local regulations relating specifically to the
ethical usage of PACS, and both the Health Professions
Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and the South African
Nursing Council (SANC) did not appear to have regulations in
this regard. This lack of policy is not uncommon considering
that the law often lags behind in keeping pace with the ad-
vances in IT (Polito, 2012).
The study found that the uncovered breach incidences
were committed by participants with inadequate system
knowledge and policy awareness while working in an
environment characterised by a culture of trust and medical
emergencies. The hurried nature associated with medical
emergencies creates an environment where mistakes are
easily made. During medical emergencies HPs may feel
justified in circumventing security to save a patient's life.
Moreover, it is a challenge to prevent unauthorised access
from authorised users. The study context was thus taken
into account during the classification of incidents. It was
found that of the 15 documented breach incidences, 11 (66%)
may have been as a result of ignorance, one (6%) may have
been accidental, while four (26%) were deemed intentional
(Table 4).
6.1. Practical implications
Policy awareness and knowledge is crucial in protecting pa-
tient confidentiality but is worthless unless put into practice.
It is thus critical that systems be implemented that can
monitor compliance with confidentiality principles among
PACS users to prevent the breach of confidentiality.7. Conclusions, limitations &
recommendations for future research
7.1. Conclusion
Not only do patients often suspect that HPs abuse their priv-
ileges of access by breaching the confidentiality of their data,
patients are also concerned about breaches arising from acts
of indiscretion. The majority of breaches uncovered in thisstudy were classified as non-intentional breaches. This study
has provided some insight into the reasons for the breaches
committed by PACS users in the two hospital settings.
It is impossible to design monitoring systems and
guidelines to address the issues of confidentiality unless the
breaches committed by PACS users are identified and clas-
sified. The findings of this study may be helpful in informing
a framework for the classification of breaches committed by
PACS users. Despite the concerns of patients regarding acts
of indiscretion, the study findings indicate that 48% of the
witnessed breaches were reported to authorities. This may
be an indication of the HPs commitment to protect
confidentiality.
7.2. Limitations
The study sample was not randomised hence, the study
findings cannot be generalised to other settings.
7.3. Recommendations
Clear organisational policy and improved awareness of
guidelines through user education and training could help
improve ethical attitudes to security issues. It is suggested
that the following interventionsmight be useful in this regard:
 The implementation of a system to monitor the technical
and human aspects of breaches. Such a system needs to be
designed through a collaborative input by hospital owners,
HPs, IT and PACS vendors.
 Institutions of higher learning should incorporate a mod-
ule on informatics in their health curriculum.
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